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A financial-institution bailout involves govern-
ment intervention through a transaction or for-
bearance targeted to a financial institution or
group of financial institutions. The action is pre-
emptive as the financial institution does not fail
and go out of business, but remains a going con-
cern, benefiting creditors, shareholders, or counter-
parties. In the absence of a bailout, the financial
institution would either be forced to go through
receivership or bankruptcy in the prescribed legal
form, or have its role in financial intermediation
disrupted. 
Financial-institution bailout policy in the
United States is implemented through three agen-
cies: the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
the Federal Reserve, and the Treasury Department.
The need for orderly financial dealings, particular-
ly in times of crisis, would dictate a consistent
approach by these agencies based on cumulative
experience, ensuring that officials devote public
resources only where there is a well-defined, trans-
parent, and verifiable policy justification for a
bailout. Yet the bailouts over the past year do not
reflect a well-defined, transparent, and verifiable
policy justification. Even in the cases where a stan-
dard has been articulated, the agencies have not
demonstrated that they can successfully imple-
ment that standard in practice.
Beyond the inconsistencies and implementa-
tion problems, financial-institution bailout policy
has been unwieldy, inequitable, extremely costly,
disruptive, and lacking in transparency and over-
sight. The policy response of bailouts and mainte-
nance of the status quo has been precisely the
wrong response, as it has led to retaining many of
the mega-financial institutions that pose systemic
risk, thus planting the seeds for future crises.
This present crisis has demonstrated that under-
taking bailouts of troubled institutions, which
involves structuring transactions that attempt to
transform the institution into a viable one, while
simultaneously projecting the reaction of investors
and markets, is a process for which government is ill-
suited. These bailout powers should be revoked.
Financial angst still hangs over the system as the
underlying imbalances that led to the crisis have not
been reconciled. The ultimate answer is to place
troubled institutions into receivership or the rele-
vant form of bankruptcy—including many of the
institutions that have already been bailed out.
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Introduction
Is there any reason why the American
people should be taxed to guarantee
the debts of banks, any more than they
should be taxed to guarantee the debts
of other institutions, including the
merchants, the industries, and the
mills of the country?1
You can’t legislate recovery.2
There has been a long history of financial-
institution bailouts in the United States dat-
ing back to the first treasury secretary,
Alexander Hamilton.3 The most recent inter-
ventions have added to the many approaches
that have been used to address financial-sector
stress. Policymakers have held out a rule that
poorly managed institutions that are threat-
ened with extinction should exit the financial
system. Yet they have always created ad hoc
exceptions to this rule as well. The need for
orderly financial dealings, particularly in times
of crisis, would dictate a consistent approach
based on cumulative experience, ensuring that
officials devote public resources only where
there is a well-defined, transparent, and verifi-
able policy justification for a bailout. 
Yet today’s bailouts do not reflect a well-
defined, transparent, and verifiable policy justi-
fication. As we set forth in the examples
throughout this analysis, the chairman of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, the
secretary of the treasury, the chairman of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and
their supporting officials have not articulated a
clear, bright-line rule to determine whether to
bail out a given financial institution. This is
not to say that such a bright-line rule could not
be found through an examination of the recent
bailouts, but merely that leadership of these
agencies has not yet publicly provided one.
Further, the standard for intervention should
not simply be that the failure of an institution
will impose losses on a broad array of creditors,
shareholders, and counterparties, or that it will
present a challenging or difficult receivership
or bankruptcy process to work through. Even
if a standard can be articulated, it is another
matter to successfully implement that stan-
dard in practice. We believe that the lack of a
clear standard and the shifting efforts at imple-
mentation have exacerbated the current finan-
cial turmoil by sending confusing and incon-
sistent signals to market participants. 
The question for analysis is whether it is
appropriate to bail out financial institutions,
and if so whether a bright-line rule can be
developed and implemented that outlines the
circumstances in which a bailout is appropri-
ate. As part of our analysis of bailouts of finan-
cial institutions, we will first need to define
what is meant by the term “bailout” and then
fit the most recent string of interventions into
the historical context. Once we review the his-
torical examples, we will determine if the use
of bailouts has been consistent over time and
if the lessons of earlier periods were recognized
and incorporated into the current approaches
or ignored. Then we will turn to developing an
appropriate standard. Through our observa-
tions and analysis, we hope to provide guid-
ance as financial turmoil continues under the
Obama administration and as these issues are
revisited in contemplated legal reforms for the
U.S. financial sector.
Definition of Bailout
For purposes of this analysis, we define a
bailout of a financial institution as possess-
ing the following elements:
• Government intervention through lend-
ing, equity injection, purchase of assets,
assisted takeover, loan guarantee, or oth-
er tangible benefit, or inaction through
regulatory forbearance for a financial
institution or group of financial institu-
tions. In the case of a transaction, the
repayment of funds extended must be at
risk, either because it is not fully collat-
eralized or otherwise fully protected.
• The action taken is preemptive, in that the
financial institution benefiting from
2
Today’s bailouts
do not reflect 
a well-defined,
transparent, and
verifiable policy
justification.
intervention does not fail and go out of
business through revocation of an operat-
ing charter and placement into FDIC re-
ceivership (commercial banks) or bank-
ruptcy (noncommercial banks), but re-
mains a going concern, thus benefiting
creditors, shareholders, or counterparties
of the financial institution. 
• In the absence of a bailout, the financial
institution would either be forced to go
through receivership or bankruptcy in
the prescribed legal form, or have its role
in financial intermediation disrupted. 
Based on this definition, recent examples of
financial-institution bailouts would include the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s bail-
out of Continental Illinois in 1984 and Citi-
group in 2008; the Federal Reserve’s bailout of
Bear Stearns and American International Group;
and the Treasury’s Troubled Asset Relief Pro-
gram and bailouts of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac. Under this definition, transactions that
would not be considered bailouts would be the
FDIC’s purchase-and-assumption or payoff
transactions, in which a troubled institution
does not remain a going concern. Additionally,
the exercise of the Federal Reserve’s lender-of-
last-resort powers would not be considered a
bailout as these loans are traditionally fully col-
lateralized.4 Interestingly enough, the so-called
“savings and loan bailout” of the 1980s and
1990s, which involved the creation of the
Resolution Trust Corporation, would not be a
financial-institution bailout under this defini-
tion, as the transactions were structured to elim-
inate the institutions as going concerns. 
Historical Analysis
of Structure of Bailouts,
Great Depression to 2007
A historical review of the major financial
crises during the past 80 years is vital to an
understanding of how the system is current-
ly structured, as the influence of these crises
molded the mandated responses to the chal-
lenges of contagion, access to credit, resolu-
tion of troubled institutions, and financial
instability.
Depression-era Banking Crisis
The Depression and the changes that
flowed from it brought us our modern banking
system. The number of banks in the United
States grew rapidly from 1887 to 1921, increas-
ing from about 5,000 to 30,000—an environ-
ment most observers of the sector would de-
scribe as overbanked.5 Throughout the 1920s,
the number of failures began to rise. By 1930,
what followed was a series of crises involving
bank failures that brought the number of
banks rapidly down to 15,000 by 1934. No less
a pair of observers than Nobel-prize-winner
Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz
of the National Bureau of Economic Research
described the first crisis in 1930 as: 
[a] contagion of fear spread among
depositors, starting from the agricultur-
al areas, which had experienced the
heaviest impact of bank failures in the
twenties. But such contagion knows no
geographical limits. The failure of 256
banks with $180 million of deposits in
November 1930 was followed by the
failure of 352 with over $370 million of
deposits in December, . . . the most dra-
matic being the failure on December 11
of the Bank of United States with over
$200 million of deposits. That failure
was of especial importance. The Bank of
United States was the largest commer-
cial bank, as measured by volume of
deposits, ever to have failed to that time
in U.S. history.6
The term “contagion” refers to a state in
the financial industry whereby a seemingly
irrational negative cascading effect causes
financial institution failures regardless of the
institution’s actual condition. As Senator
Carter Glass explained during the delibera-
tions on deposit insurance in 1933, “when
weak banks begin to topple there takes place a
disastrous psychology in the whole country
that precipitates runs on strong banks that
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break them down.”7 In the commercial bank-
ing context, this comes about when depositors
believe (whether correctly or not), that their
bank is in financial trouble based on news of
problems at other institutions, and withdraw
their funds precipitously, causing widespread
panic or a liquidity crisis in several banks.8
There is some dispute as to whether contagion
is an accurate description of the circumstances
at the time of the Depression, but as noted in
the comments of Senator Glass, it was largely
accepted at the time—and has been by many
since then—as the cause of a large number of
banking failures.9
The Reconstruction Finance Corporation,
which was proposed in 1932 by the Hoover
administration, was leveraged as a means to
bail out institutions in response to the fears of
financial contagion during the Depression.
One of its primary functions was to serve as an
emergency financial institution for the pur-
pose of making loans to and investments in
troubled financial institutions. Initially, the
RFC focused on making low-interest loans
totaling nearly $1 billion to financial institu-
tions. When that proved largely ineffective, in
1933 the RFC transitioned to making invest-
ments in preferred capital stock notes of trou-
bled financial institutions. Ultimately it
invested about $1 billion in over 6,000 banks.
These capital injections allowed many of the
institutions to meet the capital standards for
the newly created FDIC insurance.10
FDIC Open-Bank Assistance
The Long-Standing Bailout Tool. The FDIC
has a number of options under law regarding
failing financial institutions. The institution
can be addressed on a closed-bank basis, where-
by it is put through a specialized process that is
analogous to bankruptcy but tailored to banks,
and is not bailed out. This can be in the form of
an insured deposit payoff, where the institution
is closed and placed into a receivership with the
FDIC paying depositors the insured portion of
their deposits. There is also the purchase-and-
assumption (P&A) transaction where the insti-
tution is closed and an acquiring institution
selected in a competitive bid process purchases
all or a portion of the assets and assumes all or
a portion of the liabilities. During 2008,
Washington Mutual Bank and IndyMac Bank,
FSB, two large insured-thrift institutions, were
resolved through closed-bank means respec-
tively by P&A and bridge bank, a form of P&A
reserved for larger banks.11 In a P&A, any assets
not purchased go into receivership.
Alternatively, the FDIC’s open-bank assis-
tance program (OBA) involves a bailout
through the provision of financial assistance
to insured depository institutions, thus avoid-
ing closure or failure of the bank. OBA was
largely modeled after the RFC.12 It has been
the most sustained and heavily relied-upon of
the financial-institution bailout programs of
the U.S. government. This grant of power cur-
rently authorizes the FDIC to make loans to,
make deposits in, purchase the assets or secu-
rities of, assume the liabilities of, or make con-
tributions to any insured depository institu-
tion.13 Depending upon how it is structured,
OBA would also tend to benefit creditors,
shareholders, and counterparties of the insti-
tution by avoiding some of the losses imposed
in an FDIC receivership. 
The OBA power was originally granted to
FDIC in 1950, but was limited to instances
where the continued operation of the bank
receiving assistance was, in the opinion of the
Board of Directors of the FDIC, essential to
provide adequate banking service in the com-
munity.14 As OBA has evolved, it has primarily
been used to resolve insolvent institutions or
those likely to fail, as contrasted with the
Federal Reserve’s lender-of-last-resort authori-
ty, which has traditionally been used for illiq-
uid institutions (Table 1).15
In large part because of the essentiality
restriction, only a handful of banks received
OBA during its initial three decades in use.16
The essentiality test was replaced as the basis for
determining whether OBA can be granted with
the passage of the Garn–St. Germain Act of
1982. In its place was a requirement that severe
financial conditions threaten the stability of a
number of banks or of banks with significant
financial resources.17 This lower requirement
expanded the FDIC’s scope for applying OBA.
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If, however, OBA was a costlier option than liq-
uidation, then the essentiality test was still
applied.18 The broadening of the OBA authori-
ty, combined with the ensuing banking crisis,
resulted in the FDIC dramatically increasing its
reliance on OBA (see Table 2).19
Continental Illinois National Bank and
Trust—Too Big to Fail (1984). The best-known
OBA transaction was the bailout of Continen-
tal Illinois, which was also the FDIC’s largest
bank resolved prior to 2008. At the time of its
resolution, Continental Illinois was the sev-
enth-largest bank in the country with approxi-
mately $40 billion in assets. 
During the mid-1970s, Continental’s man-
agement employed a strategy of rapid growth.
From 1976 to 1981, on the asset side, Continen-
tal’s commercial and industrial lending grew by
180 percent, a large amount of which was pur-
chased from Penn Square Bank of Oklahoma,
which failed in 1982. Over this same period,
total assets grew by 110 percent, a level that far
outstripped growth at the other largest banks in
the country.20 On the funding side, Continental
began to rely less on stable core deposits and
more on volatile and riskier short-term liabili-
ties, including interbank liabilities and large cer-
tificates of deposit. Continental’s stock value
boomed during this time, from $13 at the end of
1974 to its peak at $42 in 1981, a time when
most bank stocks did not move very much at all.
After Penn Square’s failure, Continental began
to unravel. Many of the problems in its loan
portfolio came to light, and the cost of funding
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Table 1
Federal Reserve Lender of Last Resort vs. FDIC Open-Bank Assistance
Characteristics Federal Reserve Lender FDIC Open-Bank
of Transactions of Last Resort Assistance
Financial state of problem institution Illiquid Equity insolvent
Duration of assistance Short-term Long-term/permanent
Form of assistance Loan fully collateralized Loan
Capital injection
Deposit
Asset purchase
Simplicity Simple, secured lending Complex with requirements/
transaction restrictions over many years
Equity and shareholder impact None Significant or complete dilution
Source: Federal Reserve Act, Federal Deposit Insurance Act, authors’ analysis.
Table 2
FDIC Open-Bank Assistance Transactions Completed, 1950 to Present
Years OBA Transactions
1950–1981 8
1982–1992 129
1993–2007 0
2008–2009 2
Source: FDIC, Managing the Crisis: The FDIC and RTC Experience, p. 153
its short-term liabilities, which because of their
nature repriced quickly, began to rise dramati-
cally. Much of the funding was being provided
in the foreign money market. As Continental
deteriorated, these sources began to flee, trigger-
ing a bank run that ultimately led to the FDIC’s
OBA package in May 1984. The bank was
nationalized, based on the essentiality clause.21
As summarized by a former board member
of the FDIC, the real reason for the bailout (and
others like it) was that “simply put, we were
afraid not to.”22 The FDIC used OBA because it
feared that closing the institution would cause
an adverse ripple effect throughout the banking
system. The FDIC estimated that 66 banks had
more than 100 percent and 113 banks had
between 50 percent and 100 percent of their
equity capital invested in Continental. A num-
ber of those banks would have likely failed if
Continental had been closed outright.23 Unlike
under current law, the FDIC did not have the
authority to resolve Continental through a
bridge bank, as that authority was not granted
until the Competitive Equality Banking Act of
1987. All uninsured depositors and non-deposit
creditors were covered in the transaction. That
bailout of creditors contrasted sharply with the
case of many smaller bank failures during that
period, in which those outside of the deposit-
insurance limit, or debt-holders in priority
behind depositors, were not always covered. Top
management and the board of directors of Con-
tinental were removed. The FDIC infused capi-
tal through acquisition of preferred stock in
Continental Illinois Corporation. The ultimate
cost to the FDIC was approximately $1.1 bil-
lion.24 The resolution of Continental was one of
the clearest cases of the bank resolution doctrine
known as “too big to fail.” 
Changes to OBA in the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA).
Heavy reliance on OBA in the 1980s and early
1990s produced a call for an extensive reexami-
nation of the use of this resolution option, which
was chosen instead of closing banks outright.25
Although the use of OBA gives the FDIC anoth-
er resolution option and may minimize disrup-
tion to the community, it blurs the concept of a
clear exit policy whereby poorly managed insti-
tutions are taken out of the financial system.
This is because OBA:26
• was primarily used to resolve larger insti-
tutions, so owners and creditors of small-
er institutions resented the lack of a level
playing field;
•allowed weak institutions to remain open
and compete with non-assisted institutions;
• increased moral hazard, because if a bank
believes it will be bailed out when it gets
into trouble, it will take on more risk than
if OBA is not available;
• often benefited shareholders and unin-
sured creditors of the institution over a
closed-bank approach, thus reducing
market discipline;
• may be more costly than envisioned if
projections are optimistic, losses are re-
curring, and a closed-bank transaction is
ultimately needed, resulting in a long
and difficult process for completing the
transaction;27 and
• was twinned with significant tax bene-
fits to acquirers at a cost to taxpayers
that appeared to exceed any financial
benefit received by the government.
Those consequences flow in part from the
fact that regulators of financial institutions
respond to incentives: 
Regulators face perverse incentives to for-
bear and extend the federal safety net.
Forbearance means failing to take timely
and appropriate action to reduce the risk
an unhealthy institution poses to the
deposit insurance fund (e.g., by limiting
dividends, restricting excessive risk-tak-
ing, or requiring recapitalization). By
overextending the safety net, I mean
needlessly shielding an insured deposito-
ry institution from market discipline
(whether by treating the institution as
too big to fail or using Federal Reserve
discount-window loans to keep it open
when it is economically insolvent). . . .
The benefits of forbearance (and the
costs of stringency) are short-term and
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easily identifiable. The costs of forbear-
ance (and the benefits of stringency) are
long-term and less obvious. . . . Perverse
incentives similar to those fostering for-
bearance encourage regulators to overex-
tend the Federal safety net. By assuming
risks better left to private parties the gov-
ernment heightens moral hazard and the
potential for future instability. But those
costs are long-term and diffuse, and
appear in no reckoning of the govern-
ment’s obligations. Extending the safety
net confers immediate benefits concen-
trated in large financial institutions.28
In other words, choosing a bailout is often
the easy, quick-fix option for regulators, but
the choice causes long-term damage. If pressed
in the future to justify their action, they can
predictably respond that the situation would
have been worse without their intervention.
Given the flaws in OBA, Congress re-exam-
ined its use as part of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of
1991 (FDICIA),29 and took particular aim at
the doctrine of “too big to fail”:
The provisions of this legislation that
require regulators to take action before a
bank becomes insolvent, and then to
resolve failed institutions at the least pos-
sible cost, would eliminate the “too big to
fail” policy that is currently being fol-
lowed by the FDIC. Since large banks are
not necessarily healthier than their small-
er counterparts, the Committee believes
the FDIC should not use insurance
funds to keep them open simply because
of their size. . . . The current cost test con-
tains an exception where the FDIC
“determines that the continued opera-
tion of such insured depository institu-
tion is essential to provide adequate
depository services in the community.”
The FDIC has cited this clause as the
legal basis for its too-big-to-fail policy.
The Committee deliberately deleted this
clause and strongly intends that the too-
big-to-fail policy is hereby abolished.30
Since FDICIA, the FDIC may undertake
OBA if it is the least-cost method or if it meets
the systemic-risk exception, which allows OBA
only in circumscribed cases.31 To invoke the
systemic-risk exception requires agreement
that applying a least-cost test would have “seri-
ous adverse effects on economic conditions or
financial stability.” The discretion as to when
to consider invoking this exception is left to the
FDIC. However, if a resolution is not the least-
cost approach, the intent of the Congress was
to make it very difficult to undertake an OBA
transaction except in “those rare instances in
which the failure of an institution could
threaten the entire financial system.”32 The lat-
ter determination has to have the agreement of
two-thirds of the FDIC Board of Directors,
two-thirds of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve, and the secretary of the trea-
sury in consultation with the president.33
Additionally, the secretary of the treasury must
document the determination and the Govern-
ment Accountability Office must review the
decision and report to Congress on the basis,
purpose, and likely effect of the decision.34
The overall direction of the changes codi-
fied under FDICIA was to restrict the use of the
federal financial safety net and the discretion
of the FDIC. However, there was one exception
to that general principle, as under FDICIA
there was an amendment to Section 13(3) of
the Federal Reserve Act and the power to lend
under “unusual and exigent circumstances” to
“any individual, partnership or corporation”
when it “is unable to secure adequate credit
accommodations from other banking institu-
tions.”35 This change, which was inserted by
Sen. Christopher Dodd (D-CT), was adopted
without extensive discussion or debate, but the
intention was to allow fully secured, Federal
Reserve lending to securities firms in the after-
math of the 1987 stock market crash.36
Other Forms of 1980s Bank Bailouts—
Forbearance
Part of the financial-sector turmoil during
this period was due to the many structural
changes in the economy and how banks oper-
ated. For example, there was a transition from a
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heavily regulated environment of limits on in-
terest rates paid on bank deposits (Regulation
Q) to a more liberalized environment where
banks had to pay more of a market rate for
deposits. Additionally, farm-sector problems
placed stress on financial institutions. Forbear-
ance was used to get institutions through a dif-
ficult period that some argue was caused by cir-
cumstances beyond the banks’ control. For this
reason, management was generally left in
place.37 The primary forbearance programs
were the net worth certificate program,38 capital
forbearance program,39 and income mainte-
nance agreements.40
Forbearance ultimately increased the cost
of the savings and loan crisis because action
on closing institutions was deferred. In some
cases, institutions were ultimately resolved at
greater costs than if they had been closed ini-
tially, before forbearance was granted. Given
this fact, many have discredited the use of
forbearance.41
Fannie Mae Bailout during the Early 1980s
During the 1970s, Fannie Mae was able to
leverage its low cost of funds, which resulted
from its status as a government-sponsored
enterprise, to maintain profitability. GSEs are
quasi-government entities that are privately
owned, but possess certain powers or exemp-
tions that are intended to encourage select
economic activity and have the implied back-
ing of the U.S. government.42 For example,
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the mortgage
GSEs, were created to encourage mortgage
lending. Consistent with its mission, Fannie
Mae borrowed short term in the debt market
and used the funds to purchase long-term
mortgages. Starting in 1979, short-term bor-
rowing costs rose dramatically and, by 1981,
Fannie Mae had a negative market–value net
worth of $10.8 billion.43 In response, the fed-
eral government provided limited tax relief
and regulatory forbearance in the form of
relaxed capital requirements, without making
dramatic changes in management.44 Freddie
Mac, which held relatively fewer of its mort-
gages in portfolio, did not experience the same
financial difficulties as Fannie Mae. 
Farm Credit System—Too Populist to Fail
(1987)
Another area of credit turmoil during the
1980s was the Farm Credit System, which, like
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, is a GSE. It faced
problems brought on by the farm price bubble
that was inflated during the 1970s, in part
through the lending programs and encourage-
ment of the Farm Credit System. When the bub-
ble burst, prices dropped by over 50 percent
from 1981 to 1986 in many agricultural states
such as Iowa, Nebraska, and Minnesota. The
Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 created the Farm
Credit System Financial Assistance Corpora-
tion, which was authorized to issue up to $4 bil-
lion of taxpayer-funded bonds to provide capital
assistance to Farm Credit System institutions
weakened by losses arising from collapsing
farmland prices. Bonds totaling $1.261 billion
were issued with 15-year maturities.45 The legis-
lation was justified based on the “continuing
depression in agriculture that began in the early
1980s, but whose costs originated in the infla-
tionary period in the late 1960s and 1970s.”46
The State of Bailouts and Banking Circa
1991
In the early 1990s, the banking system in
the United States was in its worst shape since
the 1930s. Some 1,150 commercial and savings
banks had failed since year-end 1983, almost
double the number of failures since the intro-
duction of the FDIC in 1934 up through 1983.
Another 1,500 banks were on the FDIC’s prob-
lem-bank list. The thrift industry was in even
worse shape. More than 900 savings and loans
were resolved or had been placed into conser-
vatorship since 1983, which was a larger per-
centage of a much smaller industry.47 Drexel
Burnham Lambert, a large investment bank,
collapsed in 1990 without a government
bailout.48 Beyond Continental Illinois, numer-
ous large banks, including Bank of New
England and 9 of the 10 largest banks in Texas
(including First Republic Bank and MCorp), as
well as large savings and loans, including
American Savings and Loan and Gibraltar
Savings, still rank among the largest financial-
institution resolutions in history. What were
8
The lessons
learned from this
tumultuous 
period were 
leveraged during
the deliberations
leading up 
to the FDICIA 
amendments
passed in 1991,
awaiting the next
financial crisis.
thought to be one-off bailouts were needed for
GSEs that served the mortgage and agricultur-
al sectors. Building upon the legal infrastruc-
ture largely developed during the Depression
Era, the lessons learned from this tumultuous
period were leveraged during the deliberations
leading up to the FDICIA amendments passed
in 1991, awaiting the next financial crisis. 
The Current Financial
Crisis—Phase I and
the Early Bailouts
There was a noticeable lull in the use of
bailouts from the early 1990s until early 2008
thanks to the relative tranquility in the finan-
cial-services industry during this period. One
notable event during the intervening period
was the private-sector-led intervention of
hedge fund Long Term Capital Management
in 1998, a process to which the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York provided input.49
Probably the most dramatic difference
between the prior crises and the current one
has been the short timeframe of the current
crisis. Whereas previous financial crises took
a decade or more to unfold, the current one
has developed over a period of months, and
much of it even over a matter of weeks.
Additionally, differences in the complexity of
underlying collateral values caused greater
uncertainty and made more challenging the
process of applying bright-line rules between
illiquid banks in need of short-term lending
and insolvent banks in need of assistance.
Bear Stearns—Too Unusual/Exigent/
Interconnected to Fail (March 2008)
Bear Stearns’ difficulties in early 2008
stemmed from its involvement in the subprime-
mortgage market. Along with Lehman Brothers,
it led the way in subprime-mortgage lending
and securitizations of these loans into bonds sal-
able to other end investors. Between 2001 and
2008, a number of Wall Street firms began pur-
chasing billions of dollars of subprime loans. In
most cases, these were bought from nonbank
mortgage companies, which borrowed money
from firms like Lehman Brothers and Bear
Stearns in order to make loans and quickly resell
them. Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns were
major players in the subprime market, extend-
ing funding in the form of warehouse lines of
credit to nonbank lenders, buying the mortgage
products, turning them into mortgage-related
securities, and then selling these bonds to end
investors like insurance companies, pension
funds, local governments, and foreign banks.50
As explained by Federal Reserve Chairman
Ben S. Bernanke, the collapse of Bear Stearns
came about because of a “run” by its creditors
and customers, analogous to a run by deposi-
tors on a commercial bank. The underlying
problem was the falling prices of mortgage-
related securities, requiring Bear Stearns to
mark down the value of those securities and
post collateral against credit-default swaps it
had issued. Despite the fact that Bear Stearns’
borrowings were mostly secured (which should
have ensured repayment even if the company
itself failed), the illiquidity of markets in mid-
March was so severe that creditors lost confi-
dence that they could recoup their loans by sell-
ing the collateral. Therefore, they refused to
renew their loans and demanded repayment.
Bear Stearns’ contingency planning had not
envisioned a sudden loss of access to secured
funding, so it did not have adequate liquidity to
meet those demands for repayment. If a sale of
the firm could not have been arranged, it would
have had to file for bankruptcy. The Federal
Reserve, the SEC, and the U.S. Treasury Depart-
ment all concluded that allowing Bear Stearns
to fail so abruptly, at a time when the financial
markets were already under considerable stress,
would likely have had extremely adverse impli-
cations for the financial system and for the
broader economy and therefore agreed to bail
out Bear Stearns.51 The bailout consisted of a
$29 billion credit guarantee issued by the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York on a non-recourse
basis, collateralized by mortgage debt, and a 
subsequent Federal Reserve–facilitated acquisi-
tion of Bear Stearns by the commercial bank
JPMorgan Chase. The agreement also calls for
JPMorgan Chase to bear the first $1 billion of
any losses associated with Bear Stearns assets.52
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Bernanke defended the loans, arguing that a
Bear Stearns bankruptcy would have caused a
“chaotic unwinding” of investments across the
United States.53 Timothy Geithner, then presi-
dent of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
supplemented Bernanke’s statement: “In short,
we judged that a sudden, disorderly failure
would have brought with it unpredictable but
severe consequences for the functioning of the
broader financial system and the broader econo-
my, with lower equity prices, further downward
pressure on home values, and less access to cred-
it for companies and households.”54 The min-
utes of the meeting of the Board of Governors
where the decision was made to intervene reveal
that “given the fragile condition of the financial
markets at the time, the prominent position of
Bear Stearns in those markets, and the expected
contagion that would result from the immediate
failure of Bear Stearns, the best alternative avail-
able was to provide temporary emergency fi-
nancing to Bear Stearns through an arrange-
ment with JPMorgan Chase & Co.”55
The legal authority for the Bear Stearns trans-
action came from the expansion of authority
under FDICIA as codified in Section 13(3) of the
Federal Reserve Act. That section allows Federal
Reserve Banks “in unusual and exigent circum-
stances,” and when authorized by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, to dis-
count “for any individual, partnership, or corpo-
ration” when it “is unable to secure adequate
credit accommodations from other banking
institutions.” Prior to its use in the Bear Stearns
case, the powers under Section 13(3) had not
been used since the Great Depression in 1936,
although their use was considered in the case of
New York City in 1975, among others. The prac-
tical effect of this provision was to shift a portion
of the risk of loss from creditors onto the Reserve
Banks and indirectly onto the taxpayer. If there is
ultimately a loss on the Bear Stearns transaction
this would be inconsistent with Senator Dodd’s
expressed desire that Section 13(3) loans to secu-
rities firms be “fully secured loans.”56
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—Too
Political to Fail (September 2008)
The investment problems of Fannie Mae
in the 1980s flowed from interest-rate risk,
but the current investment problems facing
the mortgage GSEs flowed from credit risk, as
they were hurt by losses in their portfolios of
mortgage-related assets. Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac had great stock performance
over the decades prior to the subprime crisis
and they were labeled “darlings of Wall Street”
by some, but they increasingly came under
pressure to maintain their high levels of
growth in areas beyond their core businesses.
As early as the mid 1990s the GSEs began to
move into the subprime-mortgage market.57
Executives at the GSEs were well aware of the
risks that their push into subprime and Alt-A
mortgages exposed them to,58 but they likely
also felt pressure from Congress to push into
this market to fulfill affordable-housing
goals.
In July 2008, as the condition of the GSEs
began to deteriorate, the Housing and Eco-
nomic Recovery Act of 2008 was signed into
law.59 This act granted the treasury secretary the
power to “purchase any obligations and other
securities issued on such terms and conditions
as the Secretary may determine and in such
amounts as the Secretary may determine.”60
Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson famously
referred to the unlikely use of this power saying:
“If you have a bazooka in your pocket and peo-
ple know it, you probably won’t have to use
it.”61 Before deploying this power, the secretary
must first determine that it is “necessary to (i)
provide stability to the financial markets; (ii)
prevent disruptions in the availability of mort-
gage finance; and (iii) protect the taxpayer.”62
The act also raised the debt ceiling by $800 bil-
lion to $10.615 trillion.63
By September 2008, as the condition of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac continued to
deteriorate and their stock prices plummeted,
the two were placed into conservatorship by
the Director of the Federal Housing Finance
Agency, the agency responsible for the over-
sight of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.64 In a
joint announcement with the FHFA Director,
Treasury Secretary Paulson appeared to
absolve the management of the GSEs when
he noted that: 
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I appreciate the productive cooperation
we have received from the boards and the
management of both GSEs. I attribute
the need for today’s action primarily to
the inherent conflict and flawed business
model embedded in the GSE structure,
and to the ongoing housing correction.
GSE managements and their Boards are
responsible for neither.65
Despite that statement, new CEOs sup-
ported by new nonexecutive chairmen took
over management of the two GSEs. Treasury
used its power to purchase obligations and
invest up to $200 billion ($100 billion for
each GSE) in preferred stock, while warrants
were issued to Treasury representing an own-
ership share of 79.9 percent. The preferred
stock is particularly important, as pointed
out by the FHFA:
The Senior Preferred Stock Purchase
Agreements are the cornerstone of the
financial support that the U.S. Treasury
is providing to Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac. The SPSPAs effectively provide a
very long-term federal guarantee to exist-
ing and future debt holders. Each SPSA
commits the Treasury to purchase up to
$100 billion in senior preferred shares.
That commitment protects the credit
interests of all holders of the Enterprises’
senior and subordinated debt and MBS
[mortgage-backed securities].66
As of February 2009, there are no plans to
place the GSEs under receivership, which
would allow for the operations of Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac to be transitioned to
fully private entities that would no longer be
reliant on any form of government support.67
Lehman Brothers—The Bailout That
Wasn’t (September 2008)
In trying to determine when to bail and
when not to bail, it is instructive to look at an
example where a troubled institution was not
bailed out and failed. In September 2008, Leh-
man Brothers, the fourth largest investment
bank in the United States, collapsed and filed
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. Lehman
was also a heavy player in the subprime market,
issuing mortgage-related securities and holding
on to large positions in subprime and other
lower-rated mortgage tranches when securitiz-
ing the underlying mortgages. 
Federal officials struggled to organize an
acquisition or private-sector bailout of Leh-
man because of fears that a bankruptcy could
cause severe problems in the already fragile
financial markets. Secretary Paulson main-
tained that bailing out Lehman Brothers was
“never an option,” but assured the public that
it could remain confident in the “soundness
and resilience” of the financial system. At the
same time, Secretary Paulson noted that “we
don’t take lightly ever putting taxpayers’ mon-
ey on the line to support a financial institu-
tion,” though he did not rule out future bail-
outs of struggling firms.68 Julian Jessop, chief
international economist at Capital Econom-
ics, noted: 
The U.S. authorities’ unwillingness to
underwrite a rescue of Lehman Brothers
marks a new phase of the continuing
financial crisis. Further casualties look
inevitable. Sooner or later the U.S.
Treasury and the Fed had to draw the
line and the financial sector will eventu-
ally be healthier as a result. However, the
near-term outlook for the sector and the
wider economy remains grim.69
Similarly, Gerard Lyons, chief economist
at Standard Chartered Bank, said that “the
most significant event is the fact that the U.S.
authorities signaled that they are not going
to step in and protect firms that do not pose
a systemic risk.”70
In the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers
bankruptcy a number of events ensued,
many of which are interrelated, beyond the
direct impact on Lehman shareholders, cred-
itors, and counterparties:
• The “breaking of the buck” of the Reserve
Primary Fund, a money market that
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invested in Lehman Brothers Holding
Inc. debt;71
• The largest-ever one-day rise in the cost
of insurance against bond defaults in
the credit-default-swap market;72
• Exacerbation of the cash squeeze at
American International Group (see next
section);73
• Hedge fund withdrawals at Morgan
Stanley and Goldman Sachs;74
• A dramatic drop in the level of commer-
cial paper outstanding to levels experi-
enced three years earlier;75
• Rates on commercial paper increased
upwards of 300 basis points or more for
certain nonfinancial firms;76 and
• Spreads between LIBOR and T-bill rates
ballooned from 100 basis points to over
400 basis points.77
It would be difficult to make a convincing
argument that the fallout from a bankruptcy
of Bear Stearns would have created more tur-
bulence than Lehman, but that was the appar-
ent conclusion of the Federal Reserve when it
bailed out Bear Stearns but allowed Lehman
Brothers to fail. In congressional testimony,
Chairman Bernanke explained the distinction
between Lehman and institutions that were
bailed out such as Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, and AIG:
Government assistance should be given
with the greatest of reluctance and only
when the stability of the financial sys-
tem, and, consequently, the health of
the broader economy, is at risk. . . . In the
case of Lehman Brothers, a major
investment bank, the Federal Reserve
and the Treasury declined to commit
public funds to support the institution.
The failure of Lehman posed risks. But
the troubles at Lehman had been well
known for some time, and investors
clearly recognized—as evidenced, for
example, by the high cost of insuring
Lehman’s debt in the market for credit
default swaps—that the failure of the
firm was a significant possibility. Thus,
we judged that investors and counter-
parties had had time to take precau-
tionary measures.78
Bernanke’s congressional testimony says lit-
tle more than that the decision to let Lehman
fail was a judgment call, based on the fact that
public investors had known about Lehman’s
difficulties for some time. Yet the same can be
said of many other institutions. Although
many criticize the Lehman decision itself, many
more point out that the Lehman case high-
lights the apparent lack of a decision principle,
as the Federal Reserve does not seem to be
applying any clear, consistent, or coherent poli-
cy supported by detailed reasoning regarding
when the bailout of a failing financial firm is
appropriate. Market participants had to not
only anticipate future government actions, but
also price in the costs of the various ongoing
government interventions. Moreover, the num-
bers involved in the Lehman failure are at least
as big as those involved in some other cases, as
the Lehman bankruptcy will be the largest such
filing in U.S. history, covering total assets of
more than $630 billion.79 Yet Lehman was
allowed to fail, while others were thrown a life-
line. The question is why.
American International Group (AIG)—Too
Unusual/Exigent/Interconnected to Fail
Part II (September and November 2008)
Former AIG chief executive officer Hank
Greenberg aggressively pushed into areas
that had little to do with bread-and-butter
insurance specialties, like selling life insur-
ance or protecting companies against proper-
ty losses. AIG experienced a cash squeeze dri-
ven in large part by losses in a unit separate
from its traditional insurance businesses.
That financial-products unit sold the credit-
default-swap contracts designed to protect
investors against defaults on an array of
assets, including mortgage-related securities
tied to pools of subprime mortgages. As
housing values fell and the subprime-mort-
gage market crumbled, the value of the con-
tracts dropped sharply, driving $18 billion in
losses over the course of three quarters, forc-
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ing AIG to put up billions of dollars in col-
lateral.80 Internal models employed by AIG,
as well as those of most other financial insti-
tutions and ratings agencies, were fatally
flawed as to their assumptions regarding the
risk of these assets.81
When credit-rating agencies downgraded
AIG debt, these downgrades led to collateral
calls of $14.5 billion.82 AIG would have to raise
cash by liquidating the underlying collateral
securities, many of which were quite illiquid
and thus could not be sold quickly, at least not
without a huge discount. AIG executives spent
the weekend of September 13 and 14 trying to
raise cash, either from asset sales, a capital
infusion from private-equity firms, or both.
They also met with regulators to see if they
could transfer capital from some of AIG’s sub-
sidiaries to the parent holding company.83
The Federal Reserve Board determined that
a disorderly failure of AIG could add to
already significant levels of financial market
fragility and lead to substantially higher bor-
rowing costs, reduced household wealth, and
materially weaker economic performance. The
Federal Reserve Bank of New York authorized
the creation of a 24-month, credit-liquidity
facility which could be drawn upon for up to
$85 billion, with the loan collateralized by all
assets of both AIG and its primary unregulat-
ed subsidiaries. This is despite the fact that
FRBNY does not directly regulate AIG. In
exchange, the U.S. government received a 79.9
percent equity interest in AIG along with the
right to veto the payment of dividends to com-
mon and preferred shareholders.84 AIG’s chief
executive officer was asked to step aside.85
The credit facility provided to AIG, as in
the case of Bear Stearns, was under the aus-
pices of Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve
Act, even though it was never clear based on
the legislative history of FDICIA that insur-
ance firms were intended to be the beneficia-
ries of such credit.
An additional $38 billion facility was
extended to AIG in October 2008.86 The plan
came under heavy scrutiny within weeks of
the agreement.87 In mid-November 2008, the
Federal Reserve scrapped the original trans-
action of the combined $123 billion facility
and, working with the Treasury Department,
replaced it with a new $150 billion facility,
which included $40 billion of funds from
TARP. The revised structure was intended to
improve AIG’s ability to sell assets and extend
the period for asset sales, but it potentially
exposed the government to billions of dollars
in future losses. By late February 2009, yet
another new structure for the bailout was
under consideration.88
In contrast to Lehman Brothers, the deter-
mination by the Federal Reserve Board was
that intervention was necessary in the case of
AIG, as again summarized in testimony by
Chairman Bernanke:
The Federal Reserve took this action
because it judged that, in light of the
prevailing market conditions and the
size and composition of AIG’s obliga-
tions, a disorderly failure of AIG would
have severely threatened global financial
stability and, consequently, the perfor-
mance of the U.S. economy. To mitigate
concerns that this action would exacer-
bate moral hazard and encourage inap-
propriate risk-taking in the future, the
Federal Reserve ensured that the terms
of the credit extended to AIG imposed
significant costs and constraints on the
firm’s owners, managers, and credi-
tors.89
The Current Financial Crisis
—Phase II and TARP—
The “No Bank Left
Behind” Act 
(September–October 2008)
Concerns about the banking system
mounted.90 Vincent Reinhart, former director
of the Division of Monetary Affairs at the
Federal Reserve Board, summarized the state
of the financial services industry after being
whipsawed by the government responses to
the crisis:
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Until now, the responses of government
officials have been inconsistent and
improvisational. Their first impulse was
to extend the federal safety net to invest-
ment banks. Thus, in March, the Federal
Reserve rescued Bear Stearns, breaking a
60-year-old precedent by lending to a
nondepository. That set in motion an
uneven process of failure and interven-
tion. The private sector lost its incentive
to pump capital into troubled firms and
gained an incentive to pick among the
winners and losers of the government
intervention lottery. Lehman Brothers
or AIG? Washington Mutual or Wach-
ovia? Rather than forecasting underly-
ing values, financial markets were pre-
dicting government intentions. We
should not be here, but we are.91
After addressing the financial crisis on an
institution-by-institution basis throughout
2008, Paulson and Bernanke determined
that a shift was in order and that it would be
better to take a more comprehensive sys-
temwide approach rather than piecemeal
action. This shift may also have been due to
the heavy drain of resources in earlier
bailouts that focused on large financial insti-
tutions and the perceived need to address
more than this narrow population of institu-
tions. They determined that new powers were
needed that would allow for the purchase of
toxic assets from institutions.92 Paulson lob-
bied for this new power, noting that “our tool
kit is substantial, but insufficient.”93
However, Paulson appears to have had
some good initial instincts, reportedly noting
at various times throughout the crisis that: 
• the perception should be avoided that
an institution is too interconnected to
fail or too big to fail;94 and
• asking lawmakers for the power to pur-
chase hundreds of billions of dollars of
assets could incite panic and plunge the
country into a recession.95
On a number of these issues, Bernanke
reportedly won over Paulson to the side of
intervention,96 even though structuring
transactions and managing private business-
es back to health is not a core function of
government. Bernanke, a student of the
Depression, has been seemingly obsessed
with the perceived lack of intervention dur-
ing the 1930s. He has pulled out every inter-
ventionist approach available and even
dreamt up a few new ones.
Perhaps the most ill-advised of the many
actions in the lead-up to TARP has been the
unprecedented and seemingly deliberate under-
mining of the capacity of the financial markets
to address these issues without massive govern-
ment intervention. Comments in particular by
Secretary Paulson, Chairman Bernanke, and
President Bush have largely become self-fulfill-
ing prophecies, reaching a zenith with Presi-
dent Bush’s prime-time speech of September
24, 2008, from the White House:
The government’s top economic experts
warn that without immediate action by
Congress, America could slip into a
financial panic and a distressing sce-
nario could unfold. More banks could
fail, including some in your communi-
ty. The stock market would drop even
more which would reduce the value of
your retirement account. The value of
your house could plummet, foreclo-
sures would rise dramatically and if you
own a business or a farm you would
find it harder and more expensive to get
credit. More businesses would close
their doors and millions of Americans
could lose their jobs. Even if you have
good credit history, it would be more
difficult for you to get the loans you
need to buy a car or send your children
to college and ultimately our country
could experience a long and painful
recession. Fellow citizens, we must not
let this happen.97
To convince Congress of the need for
these new powers, Paulson had to also
emphasize the perceived inadequacies of
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existing authorities under law, and the dire
consequences if these inadequacies were not
addressed. He reportedly warned Sen. James
Inhofe and others on a conference call that
the situation would be far worse than the
Great Depression if he was not given the
authority to buy the toxic assets.98 Sen.
Christopher J. Dodd said the looming threats
to the U.S. economy outlined by Paulson had
galvanized lawmakers, noting that: “I’ve been
here 28 years. I’ve never been in a more sober-
ing moment.”99 “This is eerily similar to the
rush to war in Iraq,” said Rep. Mike McNulty
(D-NY), voicing deep skepticism and high-
lighting the shifting focus of Paulson and
Bernanke. “We have been told repeatedly by
this administration that the economy is fun-
damentally sound, and then all of the sudden
they say the economy is going to collapse.
That is unacceptable.”100
The scenario outlined by President Bush
has largely played out even though the precise
powers demanded were given and the hun-
dreds of billions requested were approved.
Paulson, Bernanke, and Bush brought on a
crisis of confidence in order to secure extraor-
dinary powers they saw as necessary to address
the crisis. One of the earliest observers of this
phenomenon noted:
[T]he doyens of U.S. fiscal and mone-
tary policy have ignored the most fun-
damental principle of central banking,
which is that the primary responsibility
of central bankers is to promote stabili-
ty and maintain confidence in the capi-
tal markets. Our central bankers appear
to have suddenly lost confidence both
in their own abilities and in the stan-
dard tools of fiscal and monetary policy.
The original Treasury plan—which
called for the transfer of virtually unlim-
ited taxpayer dollars and unlimited
spending discretion to Treasury with no
judicial or congressional oversight—
sent a very bad signal to the markets.
Instead of restoring confidence, this
approach to the crisis instilled more fear
and panic in the markets.101
What ultimately passed after the Congress
added some fiscal sweeteners to the bill was
the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of
2008,102 which granted the Treasury secretary
authority to purchase troubled assets in an
amount up to $700 billion outstanding at any
one time.103 The purpose of EESA was to
restore liquidity and stability to the financial
system which the Treasury interpreted to
include stimulating lending.104 Interestingly,
there was little quantitative support for this
request. As a Treasury spokeswoman noted:
“It’s not based on any particular data point.
We just wanted to choose a really large num-
ber.”105 These purchases would be made from
financial institutions—including banks, sav-
ings associations, credit unions, security bro-
kers and dealers, and insurance companies.106
However, the long-term viability of the finan-
cial institution is one required consideration
under the Act:
[I]n determining whether to engage in
a direct purchase from an individual
financial institution, the long-term via-
bility of the financial institution in
determining whether the purchase rep-
resents the most efficient use of funds
under this Act.107
During the deliberations for TARP, analo-
gies were made by former government officials
between the TARP and the Resolution Trust
Corporation.108 However, these analogies are
flawed, as the RTC acquired and disposed of
assets from mortgage-related financial institu-
tions that had been closed by their primary
regulator, either the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board or the Office of Thrift Supervision. As a
comparison, on the “buy side” those manag-
ing TARP would have to decide which assets
to purchase from which institutions and at
what prices. These three difficult decisions
were a fait accompli for the RTC because it
handed all of the assets of the failed thrifts
other than those sold to acquirers at resolu-
tion. On the “sell side,” the TARP approach
would be to hold assets until maturity or until
the secretary of the Treasury determined that
15
Paulson,
Bernanke, and
Bush brought on
a crisis of 
confidence in
order to secure
extraordinary
powers they saw
as necessary to
address the crisis.
an asset sale was “optimal.”109 The RTC, by
contrast, was directed to maximize the value
of assets, minimize the impact of transactions,
make efficient use of funds and minimize loss-
es—which generally meant a swift disposition
to avoid holding costs.110 The differences in
these two approaches made the proposed
TARP purchase of assets an entirely unwork-
able concept in practice.
Even before EESA was enacted, in the delib-
erations leading to its passage, additional
questions arose as to how TARP would work
in practice, and these questions endured as the
TARP plan was implemented. For example,
would the TARP program be limited to pub-
licly traded financial institutions and exclude
mutually held, family-owned, and other pri-
vate banks?111 Another question was whether
overseas firms and hedge funds could partici-
pate.112
Once EESA was passed, members of
Congress questioned the uses to which TARP
funds were being put.113 Banks came under
criticism for continuing to pay dividends, as
one estimate concluded that the equivalent of
about half of injections were paid out in the
form of dividends. “The whole purpose of the
program is to increase lending and inject cap-
ital into Main Street. If the money is used for
dividends, it defeats the purpose of the pro-
gram,” said Sen. Charles Schumer (D-NY),
who has called for the government to require
a suspension of dividend payments.114 Ad-
ditionally, questions arose as to whether lim-
its should be placed on banks using the mon-
ey to acquire other banks.115 Some banks also
came under fire for not utilizing TARP mon-
ey to extend loans. “In their eagerness to get
everyone on board, I think they failed to make
the program stringent enough,” noted
Schumer.116 But it is understandable that
banks would be hesitant to extend loans in
the midst of market turmoil. Political pres-
sure mounted on banks to lend the TARP
money, leading to a promise to use bailout
funds for new loans.117 This effort has pre-
dictably led to a backlash by banks that are
now refusing TARP funding to avoid the
attached conditions.118
There are a great many imbalances in the
financial markets, which will require wringing
out the excesses of mortgage-related debt to
bring prices back in line with reality. Rather
than allowing the markets to work through
these imbalances, the Treasury and Congress’s
push to invigorate lending, if successful, would
have the effect of reinflating the bubble of
credit that was beginning to deflate through
an ongoing deleveraging process. Thus, as
Treasury has interpreted renewed lending as
the best means to carry out TARP, this trans-
lates into subsidizing financial institutions
with government funding in order to encour-
age increased lending. But that is simply a rep-
etition on a grand scale of the flawed business
model underlying Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac. Worse, it constitutes government credit
allocation.
Beyond the efforts to attach strings to
TARP funds, individual members of Congress
have also reportedly made contacts to ensure
that local banks get their fair share of TARP
funding. Stories abound about contacts that
have been made by home-state delegations.
Additionally, a provision was inserted into
EESA which targeted select banks that had
less than $1 billion of assets, had been well-
capitalized as of June 30, served low- and mod-
erate-income areas, and had taken a capital hit
in the federal seizure of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac.119
Within weeks of the passage of EESA, there
was an oft-noted change of direction. Initially,
problem assets were going to be purchased from
financial institutions, and the program was sold
to Congress and taxpayers on that basis. Then
the focus turned to capital injections into
banks—or what was called the Capital Purchase
Program. The shift was caused in part by the
many challenges faced in getting the originally
envisioned asset-purchase program up and run-
ning, as Treasury had overpromised what could
reasonably be delivered in a short time. These
investments were allowed, given the broad defi-
nition of “troubled asset” under the law.120 This
change in strategy to capital injections took
place after the United Kingdom took the same
approach.121 It is also reminiscent of the
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approach of the RFC in the United States,
although that corporation focused on troubled
banks—as opposed to TARP, which focuses on
viable banks. This strategy was also supported
by the Federal Reserve Board and some promi-
nent economists in the early days of the devel-
opment of TARP.122
Participating banks had to agree to several
conditions to receive capital injections, includ-
ing limits on executive compensation, a require-
ment of Treasury’s consent before any increase
in common dividends during the initial three
years; and an open-ended provision regarding
future unilateral changes by Treasury.123 The
capital injections were undertaken by purchas-
ing senior preferred shares.124 What ensued was
a feeding frenzy by lobbyists to ensure that their
clients received a piece of the taxpayer-subsi-
dized funding.125
Once again, Paulson had concerns about
capital injections: he felt the government would
be forced to pick winners and losers; banks
might sit on the capital instead of deploying it;
and there was potential for the government to
meddle in the institutions’ affairs.126 He feared
that asking Congress for the power to invest in
companies would make private investors unwill-
ing to put money into the banks for fear of being
diluted by the government.127 However, he went
forward despite these concerns, and the first
nine purchases of equity occurred on October
28 after a meeting between Paulson, Bernanke,
and representatives from nine of the nation’s
largest banks.128 Strong-arming dilution of
ownership through government-mandated cap-
ital injections is very troubling. Reportedly,
Paulson required participation by the nation’s
largest banks, regardless of their financial condi-
tion, in order to avoid a stigma from being
attached to recipients of the government capital
injections.129
As Treasury turned to the alternative strat-
egy of injecting capital to get banks to lend, it
soon became doubtful that weakness in the
banks’ capital position was the reason for their
unwillingness to lend. For example, the
Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion
Survey solicits respondents on a quarterly basis
regarding their credit standards over the prior
three months.130 Although it is clear from the
survey that credit standards tightened for the
period from August through October 2008,
when the capital injections were debated, the
stated reasons for the tightening were primar-
ily a combination of the general economic
outlook, a reduced tolerance for risk, and
industry-specific problems (see Table 3).
Deterioration in the bank’s capital position
was near the bottom of the respondents’ eight
stated reasons for tightening credit during the
period (38.4 percent). Large banks cited deteri-
oration in capital position as a reason for
tightening of credit at a greater percent than
other banks (45.2 percent versus 28.6 percent).
Until the impact of the economy, risk toler-
ance, industry-specific concerns, and other cit-
ed reasons have been addressed, there is no
reason to believe that credit will or should nec-
essarily be flowing as readily as it did in the
recent past. Finally, in mid-2008 the FDIC
noted that more than 90 percent of institu-
tions (based on number of institutions and
total assets) met or exceeded the highest regu-
latory capital requirements.131 If banks are
hesitant to lend when so many of them inde-
pendently have sufficient capital, it is not clear
why they would lend government-injected
capital. As noted previously, if institutions are
forced by the government to lend, then that
obviously raises concerns about government
credit allocation.
Finally, the TARP approach of industry-
focused bailouts, combined with the failure to
articulate a clear standard for their use, has
opened the door to requests for bailouts from
other interests, ranging from automobile mak-
ers to real estate developers; to cities, states, and
universities; and even the porn industry.132
The Current Financial Crisis
—Phase III—
The Megabanks
Two researchers from the FDIC have noted
an increasing trend in what are called “mega-
banks,” financial institutions like JPMorgan
Chase, Wachovia, Citigroup, and Bank of
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America, which are banking behemoths. Many
of these came together as megabanks over the
past decades as a result of more than 5,000
mergers and acquisitions from the early 1990s
through 2008. They also highlight the fact
that this phenomenon has increased systemic
risk in the U.S. banking and financial system,
and that losses associated with a single mega-
bank failure have the potential to be cata-
strophic to the Bank Insurance Fund (i.e., cap-
ital position of the FDIC).133
Given the capital position of the FDIC, any
weakness displayed by the megabanks raises
critical concern. As of September 2008, the
FDIC’s Bank Insurance Fund stood at a mere
$35 billion, down from $53 billion in March
2008.134 The December 2008 year-end financial
statements should be published by March
2009, and the FDIC must disclose the impact
of the Citigroup OBA, which is discussed in
detail in this section. Additionally, a change
under EESA effective as of last October will
also be reflected in the financial statements, as
the Act temporarily increased the deposit
insurance coverage from $100,000 to $250,000
through the end of 2009. This will likely also
adversely impact the standing of the FDIC, as
it may lead to larger payouts for any institu-
tions likely to be resolved during 2009.135 The
exposure flowing from the Bank of America
OBA in January 2009, also addressed in this
section, will cause further financial deteriora-
tion. 
Wachovia Corporation—We Have Bailout
. . . Never Mind (September 2008)
Like many of the investment banks, mort-
gage GSEs, and AIG, Wachovia suffered mas-
sive losses from its mortgage-related invest-
ments, including a $100 billion portfolio of
option-ARMs inherited from its acquisition of
Golden West Financial Corporation in
California in 2006. Simultaneously, Wachovia
pushed aggressively into commercial real
estate. A new chief executive officer, Robert
Steel, was brought in to restructure Wachovia,
but by September 2008 the bank was on the
brink of failure.136
As noted previously, there was a lull in the
FDIC’s use of the OBA option from 1993
onward. A proposed acquisition of Wachovia
Corporation by Citigroup would have broken
this lull, as it was proposed in the form of an
OBA transaction. Under the amendments to
FDICIA, the secretary of the Treasury, in con-
sultation with the president on the recommen-
dation of the Federal Reserve and FDIC, must
make an emergency determination that OBA is
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Table 3
Reasons Cited by Lending Officers for Tightening of Credit 
Reasons for Tightening Credit Standards Oct. 2008 Jan. 2009
Uncertain economic outlook 98.2% 100.0%
Reduced tolerance for risk 86.8% 85.7%
Industry-specific problems 80.8% 91.8%
Decreased liquidity in secondary market 56.6% 44.9%
Less aggressive competition 49.1% 55.1%
Increase in defaults public debt market 45.3% 42.9%
Deterioration in bank’s capital position 38.5% 26.5%
Deterioration in bank’s liquidity position 36.5% 12.2%
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Division of Monetary Affairs, “October 2008 Senior Loan
Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices,” November 3, 2008; Idem, “January 2009 Senior Loan Officer
Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices,” February 2, 2009.
Note: Stated reason is considered very or somewhat important by the respondents. Period is three months, ending
October 2008 and January 2009, respectively.
necessary to avoid serious adverse effects on
economic conditions and financial stability.
However, the FDIC has not been forthcoming
on the details of how it arrived at this determi-
nation in the case of Wachovia.137 FDIC
Chairman Sheila Bair’s public explanation
notes only that the “decision was made under
extraordinary circumstances with significant
consultation among the regulators and
Treasury,” and that “this action was necessary
to maintain confidence in the banking indus-
try given current financial market condi-
tions.”138 The FDIC estimated that this trans-
action would involve zero cost to the BIF.139
Under the OBA provisions that were added as
part of FDICIA for any “emergency determina-
tion,” the secretary of the Treasury has to doc-
ument the determination, and the GAO must
review its basis, purpose, and likely effect. The
GAO has not yet undertaken a review of the
Wachovia OBA determination.140 Ultimately,
the OBA transaction was abandoned after
Wachovia and Wells Fargo came to a separate
agreement without FDIC OBA.141
Citigroup—Too Global to Fail
(November 2008)
Citigroup was hurt not only by tens of bil-
lions of dollars in write-downs of mortgage-
related securities, but also by a lack of cohesion
in implementing its business model as a global
financial conglomerate. The company failed to
turn a profit during 2008 and announced
plans to slash tens of thousands of jobs. The
failure of Citigroup’s proposed acquisition of
Wachovia triggered further uncertainty about
Citigroup’s place in the future financial land-
scape. Its share value plummeted nearly 60 per-
cent during one week in late 2008.142
Citigroup was among the nine largest U.S.
banks that agreed to sell preferred shares to
the Treasury in exchange for a combined $125
billion in TARP funds, and it received $25 bil-
lion in October 2008. Then, as its troubles
mounted, the government unveiled a plan in
November 2008 to bail out Citigroup using
OBA, with $20 billion in preferred stock
injected by the Treasury Department using
TARP funds.
As part of the plan, Treasury, the Federal
Reserve, and the FDIC agreed to guarantee
against the possibility of losses on up to $306
billion of Citigroup’s risky loans and securi-
ties backed by commercial and residential
mortgages. Under the agreement’s loss-shar-
ing arrangement: 
• Citigroup assumes all of the first $29
billion in losses on the risky pool of
assets.
• Beyond that amount, the government
will absorb 90 percent of the remaining
losses with:
• TARP funding of $5 billion.143
• FDIC funding from the BIF of $10
billion.
• Citigroup will absorb 10 percent of the
remaining losses.
• The Federal Reserve finances the remain-
ing assets with a non-recourse loan to
Citigroup, subject to 10 percent loss shar-
ing with Citigroup.144
Because the transaction was structured in
this way, with TARP in a first-loss position,
the TARP was used to indirectly “bail out”
the FDIC BIF to the extent of up to $5 bil-
lion. This was not a specified use for TARP
funding that was deliberated prior to the pas-
sage of the EESA. The FDIC did not disclose
an estimated cost to the transaction as it did
when announcing the Wachovia transaction,
and as it has historically done so when
announcing failures or open-bank assistance
transactions (see Appendix 1). Another piece
of information that was missing from the
earlier Wachovia press release was the follow-
ing statement: “On the whole, the commer-
cial banking system in the United States
remains well capitalized.”
As a condition of the bailout, Citigroup is
barred from paying quarterly dividends to
shareholders of more than one cent a share for
three years unless the company obtains con-
sent from the Treasury, FDIC, and Federal
Reserve.145 The agreement also places restric-
tions on executive compensation, including
bonuses. Some of the existing management
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team—including Vikram Pandit, who had only
joined the company a year earlier—was left in
place,146 although former Treasury secretary
Robert Rubin subsequently retired as the
senior counselor of Citigroup and announced
that he would not stand for reelection to the
board of directors.147
With operations stretching around the
globe in more than 100 countries, Citigroup
was considered such a large, interconnected
player in the financial system that its possible
collapse would have caused further damage to
already fragile financial and economic condi-
tions. In a terse and uninformative joint state-
ment, the FDIC, Treasury, and Federal Reserve
explained the reasons for the intervention: 
With these transactions, the U.S. gov-
ernment is taking the actions necessary
to strengthen the financial system and
protect U.S. taxpayers and the U.S.
economy.
We will continue to use all of our
resources to preserve the strength of
our banking institutions and promote
the process of repair and recovery and
to manage risks. The following princi-
ples guide our efforts:
• We will work to support a healthy
resumption of credit flows to households
and businesses. 
• We will exercise prudent stewardship of
taxpayer resources. 
• We will carefully circumscribe the involve-
ment of government in the financial sec-
tor. 
• We will bolster the efforts of financial
institutions to attract private capital.148
The Citigroup bailout casts substantial
doubt on the quality of the analysis and deci-
sionmaking processes used by the regulatory
agencies as the financial crisis continued to
unfold. This is reflected mainly in the inex-
plicably dramatic turnaround in the position
of Citigroup and the agencies’ reaction to it:
within weeks, Citigroup went from a poten-
tial acquirer for Wachovia—which logically
would mean it was financially stable enough
to be approved as an acquirer—to needing
tens of billions of dollars in government
assistance.149 This implies that either the lev-
el of problems at Citigroup was not known to
regulators in October when the initial TARP
funding was extended, or it was known and
the regulators had already decided that
Citigroup was too big to fail and was going to
be bailed out so it wouldn’t fail.
The Citigroup case has drawn a great deal
of attention from politicians who, apparently
emboldened by the government’s OBA inter-
vention, are providing their input on a wide
range of operational decisions for Citigroup.
Such interventions constitute de facto nation-
alization. These decisions, such as the pur-
chase of a corporate jet and the sponsorship
for the New York Mets baseball team, would
more appropriately be left to Citigroup man-
agement and point to a troublesome trend in
the unintended consequences of OBA. The
specter of nationalization will be even more
pronounced if preferred shares are converted
into common equity shares as announced in
late February 2009, leading to further uncer-
tainty about Citigroup’s future.150
Bank of America—Citigroup Cut and
Paste (January 2009)
Bank of America’s troubles primarily flowed
from its purchase in September of Merrill
Lynch, and as time passed more details were
revealed that showed dramatic deterioration in
Merrill’s portfolio. At one point, Bank of
America considered backing out of its commit-
ment to purchase Merrill, as they considered
the changed circumstances a material-adverse
change that would allow them to cancel the
deal. However, Paulson and Bernanke reported-
ly applied pressure on Bank of America to stay
with the transaction in order to avoid further
destabilizing the market, and offered it a deal
similar to the one provided to Citigroup.151
As with the Citigroup transaction, Treasury,
the Federal Reserve, and the FDIC agreed to
guarantee against the possibility of losses on
up to $118 billion of risky loans and securities
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backed by commercial and residential mort-
gages. Under a loss-sharing arrangement
under the agreement: 
• Bank of America assumes all of the first
$10 billion in losses on the risky pool of
assets.
• Beyond that amount, the Government
will absorb 90 percent of the remaining
losses with
• TARP funding an unknown share
up to $10 billion in total with FDIC,
and152
• FDIC will fund an unspecified share
from the BIF of up to $10 billion
with TARP.
• Bank of America will absorb 10 percent
of the remaining losses.
• The Federal Reserve finances the remain-
ing assets with a nonrecourse loan to
Bank of America, subject to 10 percent
loss sharing with Bank of America.153
As with Citigroup, by structuring the
transaction with TARP in a first-loss posi-
tion, the TARP was used to indirectly “bail
out” the FDIC BIF to the extent of up to $10
billion. As in the case of Citigroup, the FDIC
did not disclose an estimated cost for the
transaction (see Appendix 2). As an addition-
al historical note, Bank of America purchased
Continental Illinois after it was sold off by
the FDIC in the 1990s.
As a condition of the bailout, Bank of
America is barred from paying quarterly divi-
dends to shareholders of more than one cent a
share for three years unless the company
obtains consent from the Treasury, FDIC, and
Federal Reserve. The agreement also places
restrictions on executive compensation, includ-
ing bonuses.154
Making Sense of 
the History—Why the
Bailout Option Was Chosen
The bailout option was chosen for a wide
variety of policy justifications as detailed in the
following summary table (Table 4). Unfortu-
nately, there has never been a clear, bright-line
rule that has been consistently followed over
the decades as to how or when a financial insti-
tution should be bailed out. The standards and
forms used have been varied and vague, and
have depended upon the underlying policy jus-
tification for intervention. 
There was a familiar pattern with each of the
cited bailouts, whether it was during the
Depression, the 1980s, or the current economic
crisis. Initially, the financial institution took on
risks through aggressive growth strategies that
achieved what seemed to be above-average or
extraordinary gains. Eventually, markets and
values began to turn, and ultimately a corrective
financial spiral was triggered that put the finan-
cial institution on the brink of failure. Too
often, delays in recognizing losses and regulato-
ry forbearance compounded the losses. There
was also a pattern to the legislative response. In
each case following the financial crisis new leg-
islative changes were implemented that were
supposed to address the problem. During the
1930s, deposit insurance, Section 13(3), and the
RFC addressed contagion, undercapitalization,
and a credit crunch. Bridge bank authority dur-
ing the 1980s and the systemic risk exception
during the 1990s addressed the notion of “too
big to fail.” During the current crisis, TARP
once again addressed a credit crunch. Yet many
of these problems still endure into 2009.
Setting a Bright-Line Rule—
The Public Pronouncements
The justifications for the series of bailouts
during the current crisis have been devoid of
transparency regarding the precise, institu-
tion-specific justification for intervention.
There has been no bright-line rule. The norm
for each has been a series of vague conclusory
statements containing select buzzwords (sta-
bility, disruption, contagion, fragile/fragility,
protect taxpayers) (see Table 5). The true con-
sistent basis for intervention is clear from the
statements regarding Bear Stearns and AIG,
but is unstated in the others: “prominent posi-
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Table 4
Bailout Programs and Underlying Policy Justifications
Institution or Program Structure Policy Justification/Standard
Reconstruction Finance Corporation Loans/preferred stock Contagion, undercapitalization, and to 
encourage lending
Continental Illinois Open-bank assistance Too big to fail
Bank forbearance Regulatory forbearance Changes in macroeconomic environment
Fannie Mae (1981) Tax relief and regulatory forbearance Changes in macroeconomic environment
Farm Credit System Government-backed debt Sustain farm economy
Bear Stearns Loan Unusual and exigent circumstances/
too interconnected to fail
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (2008) Preferred stock Maintain stability, prevent disruption in 
mortgage market, and protect taxpayers
American International Group Loan Unusual and exigent circumstances/too
Ownership stake interconnected to fail
Wachovia Open-bank assistance Systemic risk
Troubled Asset Asset purchase Encourage lending
Relief Program Preferred stock
Citigroup Open-bank assistance Systemic risk
Bank of America Open-bank assistance Systemic risk
Table 5
Stated Justifications for Individual Institution Bailouts
Descriptions Bailout (date)
“prevent a disorderly failure of Bear Stearns and the unpredictable but likely severe consequences Bear Stearns
for market functioning and the broader economy” (March 2008)
“likely would have led to a chaotic unwinding of positions in those markets and could have severely 
shaken confidence”
“a sudden, disorderly failure of Bear would have brought with it unpredictable but severe consequences 
for the functioning of the broader financial system and the broader economy”
“fragile condition of the financial markets at the time”
“prominent position of Bear Stearns in those markets”
“expected contagion that would result from the immediate failure” 
“providing stability to financial markets” Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac
“supporting the availability of mortgage finance” (September 2008)
“protecting taxpayers”
“add to already significant levels of financial market fragility” AIG 
“in light of the prevailing market conditions” (September 2008)
tion” and “size and composition.” These are
euphemisms for the discredited “too big to
fail” doctrine, yet for all intents and purposes
it is the same policy. When pressed by outside
parties or the media for further details, the
agencies cling to laws such as the Freedom of
Information Act and Government in the
Sunshine Act, which ironically were meant to
force government agencies to disclose infor-
mation more fully.155
Individual Institution Bailouts
So, the question remains: what should be
the standard for when the government may
consider intervention to bail out a financial
institution? The answer depends on a diffi-
cult balancing. The following discourse in
the aftermath of the Bear Stearns bailout
indicates the challenge in resolving the com-
peting, and sometimes conflicting, desires of
retaining market discipline, but also avoiding
market failure:
Now that the Fed has stepped in, it’s
possible that things will go back to nor-
mal. But let’s hope they don’t get too
normal: one of the biggest problems in
the market in the past decade has been
that lenders, clients, and even ordinary
small investors have put far too much
faith in the magical abilities of Wall
Street firms, and have failed to give their
promises and performance proper
scrutiny. Markets require trust to work
well, but when trust is blind they are
almost guaranteed to go haywire. We
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Table 5 Continued
Descriptions Bailout (date)
“the size and composition of AIG’s obligations” 
“severely threatened global financial stability”
“severe financial conditions exist which threaten the stability of a significant number of insured Wachovia
depository institutions or of insured depository institutions possessing significant financial resources” (September 2008)
“would create systemic risk to the credit markets”
“necessary to avoid serious adverse effects on economic conditions and financial stability”
“necessary to maintain confidence in the banking industry given current financial market conditions”
“committed to supporting financial market stability” Citigroup
“strengthen the financial system and protect U.S. taxpayers and the U.S. economy” (November 2008)
“commitment to support financial market stability” Bank of America
“strengthen the financial system and protect U.S. taxpayers and the U.S. economy” (January 2009)
Sources: Bear Stearns-Ben S. Bernanke (testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, April 3, 2008); “Key Bear Deal
Players Speak Out,” CNNMoney.com, April 3, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/ galleries/2008/news/0804/gallery.bear_stearns_hearing/5.html. 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Minutes of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,” March 14, 2008.
Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac-U.S. Department of the Treasury, “Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. on Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency
Action to Protect Financial Markets and Taxpayers,” September 7, 2008. 
AIG- Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, Press Release, September 16, 2008. Ben S. Bernanke, “U.S. Financial Markets” (testimony before the U.S.
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, September 23, 2008). 
Wachovia: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, “Minutes of the Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,” September
9, 2008, p. 9, 10. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, “Citigroup Inc. to Acquire Banking Operations of Wachovia,” September 29, 2008.
Citigroup: Treasury, Federal Reserve, and FDIC (joint statement on Citigroup, November 23, 2008), and attachment on Summary of Terms. 
Bank of America: Treasury, Federal Reserve, and FDIC (joint statement on Bank of America, January 16, 2009), and attachment on Summary of Terms.
don’t want the paralytic level of skepti-
cism that has reigned in the market-
place in recent months to continue, but
we don’t want a return to the way things
were, either. It’s a good thing that Bear
Stearns was saved. But it’s also a good
thing that it nearly died.156
If a large institution fails, and if that trans-
lates into losses for creditors, shareholders,
or counterparties of that institution, that in
and of itself is not a market failure that
should be addressed. Quite the opposite is
true. It is the proper role of markets to trans-
mit information regarding the quality of
investments. Anna Schwartz probably put
the issue of credit losses best in perspective:
It’s very easy when you’re a market par-
ticipant to claim that you shouldn’t
shut down a firm that’s in really bad
straits because everybody else who has
lent to it will be injured. Well, if they
lent to a firm that they knew was pret-
ty rocky, that’s their responsibility. And
if they have to be denied repayment of
their loans, well, they wished it on
themselves. The [government] doesn’t
have to save them, just as it didn’t save
the stockholders and the employees of
Bear Stearns. Why should they be wor-
ried about the creditors? Creditors are
no more worthy of being rescued than
ordinary people, who are really inno-
cent of what’s been going on.157
So, the bright-line rule should not simply
be laid down when an institution’s failure
would cause a cascading impact that is broad-
based and would cause other failures. But that
is the standard that was used when an individ-
ual institution failed during the current crisis,
with vague statements made about how it
would cause disruptions or compromise
fragility, stability, or confidence. If the major
justification is that the institution is large,
then we are back to the “too big to fail” doc-
trine that was so roundly criticized in the
development of FDICIA. When regulators
send the signal that complexity or size means
an institution is more likely to be bailed out,
then the result of the current bailouts will be,
as has happened in the past, to encourage the
structuring of complex and large institutions. 
The current bailouts were hastily crafted,
not well thought out, and as a result constantly
changed direction in scope and focus. Policy-
making seemed to proceed as if uninformed by
the history of the 1980s financial crisis, a histo-
ry that educates us that the proper approach is
to close down troubled institutions. The con-
stant changes in direction bring to mind
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “bold, persis-
tent experimentation.” As described in a recent
book on the Depression, the concern with that
approach is “not merely the new policies that
were implemented but also the threat of addi-
tional, unknown policies. Fear froze the econo-
my, but that uncertainty itself might have a cost
was something the young experimenters simply
did not consider.”158
For example, as the crisis unfolded in 2007,
the key policymakers first appeared unsure
about the causes and urgency of the crisis in a
process characterized by regularly timed over-
statements and subsequent reversals. Secretary
Paulson and Chairman Bernanke led the
process of the bailouts. Tracing back the histo-
ry of the subprime problems, as the initial dif-
ficulties in the market began to be revealed, the
record shows that both were initially skeptical
that the problems in the subprime market pre-
sented a serious potential shock to financial
stability. In response to a question on the melt-
down in the subprime mortgage market,
Paulson noted definitively that “I don’t think it
poses any threat to the overall economy.”159
Similarly, in a speech on the subprime-mort-
gage market, Bernanke was confident in his
proclamation that “[i]mportantly, we see no
serious broader spillover to banks or thrift
institutions from the problems in the sub-
prime market; the troubled lenders, for the
most part, have not been institutions with fed-
erally insured deposits. . . . All that said, given
the fundamental factors in place that should
support the demand for housing, we believe
the effect of the troubles in the subprime sector
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on the broader housing market will likely be
limited, and we do not expect significant spill-
overs from the subprime market to the rest of
the economy or to the financial system.”160
FDIC Chairman Sheila C. Bair has also been
surprised by the extent of the large institution
failures.161
A valiant attempt was made to develop a
bright-line rule of contagion, which was used
by the Federal Reserve to describe the potential
fallout from the failure of Bear Stearns.
Bernanke set out such a rule of thumb, and
based on his testimony he concluded that Bear
Stearns had met this test and Lehman Brothers
did not. However, as of yet, the Federal Reserve
has not released details on the precise conta-
gion that would have resulted from a Bear
Stearns bankruptcy.162 The rationalization giv-
en by the Federal Reserve for not intervening
when Lehman failed, which largely focused on
how far in advance affected parties knew about
the troubles of the institution, is not a satisfy-
ing standard. An argument can be made that,
to varying degrees, in each of the cases of large,
troubled institutions there were indicators of
the problems in advance. Such a standard
introduces all matter of problems of measure-
ment of market knowledge and would actually
give an incentive for troubled financial institu-
tions to avoid publicly revealing the details of
difficulties. 
More recently, the FDIC has had to grapple
with implementation of the systemic risk
exception codified under FDICIA. Efforts to
publicly pronounce a bright-line rule and to
support each decision with institution-specific
reasoning ended around mid-September 2008.
As 2008 wore on, the International Monetary
Fund’s member nations committed to pre-
venting the failure of systemically important
institutions and the approach of “constructive
ambiguity” was pursued. Under this approach
no clear public announcement is made to set
forth a rule or to offer institution-specific rea-
sons why an institution is bailed out.163 This
approach appears to have begun with the
FDIC’s OBA transaction for Wachovia and was
also displayed in the most recent OBA transac-
tions for Citigroup and Bank of America,
which were joint efforts of the FDIC, Treasury,
and Federal Reserve. The latter two pro-
nouncements are so sanitized of institution-
specific detail that over half of the verbiage for
the joint press releases announcing the trans-
actions are identical (compare Appendixes 1
and 2). Thus we have no answers to questions
such as why the decision was made to bail out
Wachovia, Citigroup, and Bank of America,
while Washington Mutual and IndyMac were
not. This result is consistent with what two
FDIC researchers and a co-author refer to as
“optimal bailout policy,” which mimics in
practice what the FDIC appears to be follow-
ing: (1) a guaranteed bailout for big institu-
tions (too big to fail); (2) a randomized bailout
for medium-sized institutions (constructive
ambiguity); and (3) no bailout for small insti-
tutions.164 Based on the recent OBA transac-
tions, Wachovia, Citigroup, and Bank of
America appear to fall into the first category of
“too big to fail.” IndyMac and Washington
Mutual were on the losing end of the random-
ized bailout for medium-sized institutions.
TARP and the Viability Test
The TARP approach was an attempt at yet
another standard for bailouts, whereby the
institution must be “viable” consistent with
the objective of targeting healthy institutions
that would be in a position to lend. This is a
truly unprecedented characteristic of the TARP
in expending resources to benefit institutions
that are not threatened by imminent failure. It
wasn’t employed during the Depression or
during the 1980s. As recently as January 2009
Assistant Treasury Secretary Neel Kashkari,
who is leading the group within Treasury over-
seeing the TARP expenditures, emphasized in
response to a question on TARP that it was “a
healthy bank program” and that “banks must
be deemed viable without government assis-
tance to be eligible for the program.”165
Although this was a stated consideration, as
codified in EESA, to focus on viable institu-
tions, it was eviscerated in the case of Citigroup,
Inc., and Bank of America. For example, Citi-
group received $25 billion of TARP funding in
late October, but it deteriorated so quickly
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thereafter that it was resolved through OBA in
late November with an additional $20 billion of
TARP funding. Bank of America received $15
billion and Merrill Lynch received $10 billion of
TARP funding in late October, and they were
also resolved through OBA in January, with $20
billion in additional TARP funding. 
Policy Prescriptions and
Necessary Changes
Financial-institution bailout policy, as it
has been carried out during this crisis, has been
unwieldy, inequitable, extremely costly, disrup-
tive, inconsistent, and lacking in transparency
and oversight. The current allocation of sepa-
rate bailout powers leaves us with a three-head-
ed hydra possessing vast powers that are imple-
mented through the Treasury Department,
Federal Reserve and FDIC. In the wake of
Continental Illinois, Congress tried to slay the
dreaded “too big to fail” policy when it passed
FDICIA. However, “too big to fail” has come
roaring back during the current financial crisis.
Government policy, in large part, has con-
tributed to the financial crisis by allowing
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and megabanks to
pose obvious systemic risk and by extending
the safety net to investment banks. The policy
response of bailouts and maintenance of the
status quo has been precisely the wrong
response, as it has led to retaining many of the
mega-institutions by providing bailouts pri-
marily to large institutions, thus planting the
seeds for future crises as they continue to pose
systemic risk. By not letting these mega-insti-
tutions fail, the government incentivizes them
to take on excessive risks in the future, in a clas-
sic case of moral hazard. This crisis has demon-
strated that undertaking bailouts, which
involves structuring transactions that attempt
to transform a troubled institution into a
viable one, while simultaneously projecting the
reaction of investors and markets, is a process
for which government is ill-suited. The under-
lying imbalances that led to the crisis have not
been reconciled.
Secretary Paulson has said that he has
learned two primary policy lessons from the
past year of bailouts: (1) the Treasury Depart-
ment, the Federal Reserve, and FDIC should
have a limitless range of tools that allow them
to undertake all matter of interventions to
address financial instability; and (2) there is no
playbook for responding to turmoil we have
never faced.166 This intended advice to the
incoming Obama administration, given during
late 2008, was wrong on both counts. Govern-
ment policy regarding financial stability should
have as its goal the smooth functioning of
financial institutions in their role as intermedi-
aries. This would include avoiding actions that
exacerbate systemic risk, cause disruptions, or
extend periods of disruptions in the market. It
should not have as its goal the avoidance of
financial institution failures through opaque
transactions that limit the process of price dis-
covery. Imbalances leading to financial-sector
instability can cause short-term difficulties, but
bailouts merely put off making the necessary
adjustments to bring these imbalances back in
line. At the beginning of 2008, there was an
existing legal infrastructure in place, based on
decades of experience with financial stress, to
address nearly all of the challenges that ulti-
mately arose during the course of the year.167
There has been little evidence presented of any
inherent flaws in the FDIC liquidation or feder-
al bankruptcy process that would justify
bypassing these established processes.
In the initial months after the election, the
incoming Obama administration smartly kept
a safe distance from TARP issues.168 In recent
weeks since the inauguration, the administra-
tion has begun to shape more definitively a
policy approach to the issue of bailouts. Presi-
dent Obama, who campaigned on the themes
of openness and transparency, must first
address the challenges the three agencies have
had with providing clear and supported justifi-
cations for their interventions. Unfortunately,
Secretary Timothy F. Geithner’s much-antici-
pated summary of the administration’s game
plan was incredibly light on details.169 As to
bailout policy, the summary noted the estab-
lishment of a public-private investment fund,
an idea that seems to be an improvement over
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the government-centric focus of the previous
administration. However, there was little
change at all to the unsuccessful TARP pro-
gram other than to mandate further addition-
al conditions on capital assistance.170 Future
policy is predictable: if conditions improve, the
administration will take credit; if conditions
worsen, they will simply blame the Bush
administration and ask for more powers and
more funding. Unfortunately, there is little talk
about what really needs to be done: place the
troubled institutions in FDIC receivership or
the relevant form of bankruptcy, including
many of the institutions that have already been
bailed out.
FDIC Open-Bank Assistance
The Congress granted the FDIC OBA pow-
ers nearly 60 years ago to assure that regula-
tors had options to address communities
whose access to banking services were threat-
ened by bank failure. As OBA has evolved, it
has become an expensive example of publicly
provided corporate welfare for megabank
creditors, shareholders, and counterparties,
with little evidence presented that it has pro-
tected the financial system from systemic risk
or that it has been a source of stability during
the current crisis. 
As a result of a dearth of information from
the FDIC, it is challenging to come up with
policy recommendations to address the cur-
rent crisis. The FDIC, which in the past has
been a reliably transparent agency, is now secre-
tive and is not consistently disclosing support
for its actions, even when pressed with formal-
ized requests. By contrast, the Continental
Illinois bailout in 1984 was based on solid sta-
tistics released within a few months of the res-
olution.  While it is possible to debate the mer-
its of the Continental Illinois bailout, it can at
least be explained by reference to objectively
verifiable facts, from which it can be concluded
that an adverse effect would likely have
occurred in the absence of such action. 
An infrastructure for OBA requires either
giving the FDIC complete discretion or circum-
scribing the use of OBA. Over the years it has
been in use, it is clear that giving the FDIC broad
discretion in implementing OBA predictably
leads to massive bailouts in times of crisis, given
the perverse incentives to forbear and extend the
federal safety net.171 Congressional efforts to
establish the precise circumstances under which
to grant OBA in FDICIA have given us industry
consolidation and even larger institutions that
meet the “systemic risk” test. The search for a
reliable bright-line rule that works in practice
has come up empty. The FDICIA-mandated
reviews of all OBA transactions by the GAO,
which will report on the basis, purpose, and like-
ly effect of the determination that OBA was nec-
essary, may take up to a year after the transac-
tions to be completed. The GAO reviews will
likely provide good insights, but they will arrive
too late to make a difference.
Traditional processes for liquidating large
institutions continue to work. These processes
were followed in the case of Washington
Mutual Bank and Indymac Bank. They also
may be followed with Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac, although not administered by FDIC. In
the current environment the FDIC may argue
that this option is not possible given its weak-
ened financial position and resource con-
straints. Our recommendation is to discuss
more transparently any resource constraints
and rely exclusively on P&A transactions,
including invoking bridge bank or conservator-
ship authority, rather than the current reliance
on OBA.
Federal Reserve Section 13(3) and
Financial Stability
The powers of the Federal Reserve should
be limited to those that clearly facilitate
achievement of its statutory objective:
maintain long-run growth of the mon-
etary and credit aggregates commensu-
rate with the economy’s long-run
potential to increase production, so as
to promote effectively the goals of max-
imum employment, stable prices, and
moderate long-term interest rates.172
The traditional role of the Federal Reserve in
times of financial instability has been to lend on
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good collateral to illiquid commercial banks, a
role that supports this objective. Now broader
lending authorities have been bestowed upon
the Federal Reserve to address the overall stabil-
ity of the financial system, including lending to
financial institutions beyond the commercial
banking sector. In 1991, with almost no debate,
Congress expanded Section 13(3) and clarified
the Federal Reserve’s power to extend credit to
securities dealers. This was done even though
this newly granted power was completely at
odds with the lessons from the financial crisis
of the 1980s—that the federal safety net should
be minimized in order to conserve public
resources. The changes to Section 13(3) were a
dangerous grant of broad authority, with
almost no limits, on the power of intervention
and take the focus of the Federal Reserve away
from its specified objective. 
The current crisis makes clear the difficul-
ties of granting such broad-based authority
and the challenges involved in implementa-
tion, as well as the pitfalls of having so much
power concentrated in the hands of the
Federal Reserve. The turmoil after the Lehman
Brothers failure is not so much an argument
for intervention in that case, but rather an
indicator of the impossibility of implement-
ing a clear bright-line rule for bailouts. Efforts
to distinguish a bright line between Bear
Stearns and Lehman Brothers, and the lack of
a consistent policy coupled with the multiple
efforts to address the crisis, contributed to the
angst visited upon market participants during
2008 and 2009. Even with the economic analy-
sis resources at its disposal, the Federal
Reserve has been unable to reliably predict
contagion or judge an appropriate timing or
level of intervention. Like the FDIC, the
Federal Reserve has also been opaque with
regard to the precise institution-specific rea-
sons for intervention, which is seemingly at
odds with Chairman Bernanke’s historical
emphasis on transparency regarding central
bank policy.173
The broadening of the power to lend,
combined with the difficulty of valuing
many of the mortgage-related assets held by
financial institutions during the current cri-
sis, has led to likely losses on extensions to
Bear Stearns and AIG. This is inconsistent
with the intent of the changes to Section
13(3), which allows lending so long as it is
fully secured. The Federal Reserve should
have its powers to lend returned to its former
role as lender of last resort on good collateral
for the purpose of maintaining liquidity,
although this is a more challenging role in
the current environment. The federal bank-
ruptcy process should be the source of resolv-
ing troubled institutions, as it was for
Lehman Brothers. 
Treasury Department’s TARP, Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac
The supporters of TARP had good inten-
tions in their efforts to restore the banks to
their role as financial intermediaries at former
levels. However, underlying their argument
was the simplistic notion that if banks are hes-
itant to lend because of market conditions, all
that needs to be done is to pass a law to rectify
the situation. The process of talking down the
economy in order to secure these unprece-
dented and untested powers to provide hun-
dreds of billions of dollars to predominantly
viable financial institutions has done enor-
mous damage to market confidence and sta-
bility. What ensued was Washington at its
worst: hastily crafted legislation, pork-barrel
politics, fear-mongering, unintended conse-
quences, and a feeding frenzy for lobbyists and
members of Congress alike. It is encouraging
that in Treasury Secretary Geithner’s confir-
mation testimony he placed a priority on the
need to “unwind the extraordinary interven-
tions taken to stabilize the financial sector,”174
but it is difficult to reconcile with the talk of
further bailouts coming from the Obama
administration.
As in the case of TARP, the policy justifi-
cations behind the creation of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac were well-intended. But the
results were these behemoths that were “too
big to fail” that posed an enormous systemic
risk to the financial system. The next step is
to move the pair from conservatorship to
receivership to reduce the systemic risk going
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forward and wind down the government
sponsorship which Secretary Paulson rightly
called a “flawed business model.”175
Appendix 1:
Citigroup Press Release 
(November 23, 2008)
Joint Statement by Treasury, 
Federal Reserve and the 
FDIC on Citigroup
Washington, DC—The U.S. government is
committed to supporting financial market sta-
bility, which is a prerequisite to restoring vigor-
ous economic growth. In support of this com-
mitment, the U.S. government on Sunday
entered into an agreement with Citigroup to
provide a package of guarantees, liquidity
access and capital.
As part of the agreement, Treasury and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation will
provide protection against the possibility of
unusually large losses on an asset pool of
approximately $306 billion of loans and secu-
rities backed by residential and commercial
real estate and other such assets, which will
remain on Citigroup’s balance sheet. As a fee
for this arrangement, Citigroup will issue pre-
ferred shares to the Treasury and FDIC. In
addition, and if necessary, the Federal Reserve
stands ready to backstop residual risk in the
asset pool through a non-recourse loan.
In addition, Treasury will invest $20 billion
in Citigroup from the Troubled Asset Relief
Program in exchange for preferred stock with
an 8 percent dividend to the Treasury. Citi-
group will comply with enhanced executive
compensation restrictions and implement the
FDIC’s mortgage modification program.
With these transactions, the U.S. govern-
ment is taking the actions necessary to
strengthen the financial system and protect
U.S. taxpayers and the U.S. economy.
We will continue to use all of our resources
to preserve the strength of our banking insti-
tutions and promote the process of repair and
recovery and to manage risks. The following
principles guide our efforts:
• We will work to support a healthy
resumption of credit flows to households
and businesses. 
• We will exercise prudent stewardship of
taxpayer resources. 
• We will carefully circumscribe the involve-
ment of government in the financial sec-
tor. 
• We will bolster the efforts of financial
institutions to attract private capital. 
Appendix 2: 
Bank of America Press
Release (January 16, 2009)
Treasury, Federal Reserve,
and the FDIC Provide
Assistance to
Bank of America
Washington, DC—The U.S. government
entered into an agreement today with Bank of
America to provide a package of guarantees,
liquidity access, and capital as part of its com-
mitment to support financial market stability.
Treasury and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation will provide protection against
the possibility of unusually large losses on an
asset pool of approximately $118 billion of
loans, securities backed by residential and com-
mercial real estate loans, and other such assets,
all of which have been marked to current mar-
ket value. The large majority of these assets
were assumed by Bank of America as a result of
its acquisition of Merrill Lynch. The assets will
remain on Bank of America’s balance sheet. As
a fee for this arrangement, Bank of America
will issue preferred shares to the Treasury and
FDIC. In addition, and if necessary, the Federal
Reserve stands ready to backstop residual risk
in the asset pool through a non-recourse loan.
In addition, Treasury will invest $20 bil-
lion in Bank of America from the Troubled
Assets Relief Program in exchange for pre-
ferred stock with an 8 percent dividend to the
Treasury. Bank of America will comply with
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enhanced executive compensation restric-
tions and implement a mortgage loan modi-
fication program.
Treasury exercised this funding authority
under the Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act’s Troubled Asset Relief Program. The in-
vestment was made under the Targeted
Investment Program. The objective of this pro-
gram is to foster financial market stability and
thereby to strengthen the economy and protect
American jobs, savings, and retirement security.
Separately, the FDIC board announced
that it will soon propose rule changes to its
Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program to
extend the maturity of the guarantee from
three to up to 10 years where the debt is sup-
ported by collateral and the issuance sup-
ports new consumer lending.
With these transactions, the U.S. govern-
ment is taking the actions necessary to
strengthen the financial system and protect
U.S. taxpayers and the U.S. economy. As was
stated in November when the first transaction
under the Targeted Investment Program was
announced, the U.S. government will contin-
ue to use all of our resources to preserve the
strength of our banking institutions and pro-
mote the process of repair and recovery and to
manage risks.
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